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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
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Volume XXVI DECEMBER, 1940 Number 1
ANTITRUST-THE REACH AFTER NEW WEAPONS
WALTON HAMILTONt AND IRENE TILL't
The Advisory Opinion
All of the sanctions in the Sherman Act-the plea in equity,
the criminal action, the libel on the goods, the private suit for
damages-rely directly upon litigation and the courts. In the
procedure all that government or private party can do is to make
complaint; it is for the judiciary to straighten out the tangled
lines of the industrial pattern. The result is a dual system of
control: the accusing party does no more than raise the ques-
tion; its settlement is up to the courts. Such an antiphonal pro-
cess of administrative initiative and litigious response makes the
technology of regulation a very involved process. It is slow,
clumsy, inefficient; and it is usually a moral victory, rather than
an industrial corrective, which a resort to law will yield.
The reach after new weapons began early in the administra-
tion of the antitrust law. The advisory opinion got its toe-hold
almost by accident. In 1913, when James Clark McReynolds be-
came Attorney General,' an amicable settlement was brewing
with the American Telegraph and Telephone Company. As a
gentleman dealing with gentlemen, the head of Justice did not
insist upon a formal decree and a court sanction. The word of
the company was enough. The Department, he stated, would not
abate "the insistence that statutes must be obeyed"; it desired "to
promote all business conducted in harmony with the law"; it wel-
comed opportunity to effect adjustments necessary to the "re-
establishment of lawful conditions without litigation. ' 2 In re-
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
't Economist, Temporary National Economic Committee.
1. Now, of course, Mr. Justice McReynolds.
2. Quoted in Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice (1937) 344.
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sponse to such a stimulus, numerous business men descended
upon Justice with their problems. The Attorney General was
firm in a refusal to confer except in instances in which the De-
partment had taken action. An initial drive to forestall litigation
through negotiation failed.
An opening wedge, however, was not easily withdrawn. A go-
ing concern is a cosmos of activities and the business executive
wants to discover his shortcomings, amend illegal ways, avoid
exposure to litigation. Against a pressure so persistent and
praiseworthy, resistance gradually gave way. At first the con-
ferences were so informal and occasional that no record is left;
by the mid-twenties it was publicly acknowledged by the At-
torney General as established practice. It was made clear that a
favorable ruling merely promised immunity from immediate
prosecution; it had no binding effect upon a later administra-
tion. In recent years the trend has been away from "coopera-
tion." The Department's position has been that the government
cannot barter away its power to sue in an extra-judicial proceed-
ing.
In spite of such professions, businessmen habitually call at
Justice. They seek to secure some inkling of an official attitude
toward their practices. If they represent an industry of impor-
tance, custom dictates a ceremonial call upon the Attorney Gen-
eral. To raise issues they must go to the head of the Division
and are usually referred to officials of lower rank. It is, at the
very beginning, pointed out with scrupulous care that nothing
said can bind Justice. Yet as interview follows interview, upon
the facts disclosed, the official does render a legal opinion. The
informal conference has too confirmed a place within the folk-
ways of the law to be excluded from Antitrust. And so insistent
is the demand that the Division has been forced to recognize a
procedure which-welcomed, sanctioned, or frowned upon-goes
on as a matter of course.3
3. In an address before the Trade and Commerce Bar Association of
New York on March 21, 1940, Wendell Berge, official of Antitrust, suggested
a "procedure whereby parties may make full disclosure to the Department
about the facts of any activity which they have undertaken or desire to
undertake. If the Department finds that such activity violates the law it
will so inform the parties who must thereafter act at their peril in the
event they disagree with the Department's position. If, however, the De-
partment is not in a position to state positively that the practices are illegal
at the time they are submitted, either because of lack of personnel to investi-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss1/1
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The current procedure falls short of the demands of business
executives. It marks out a rough limit of tolerance; it reveals,
at least for the time, the temper of the personnel charged with
enforcement. But it subjects industrial practice to no definitive
scrutiny; it gives no assurance that the conferee of today may
not become the prosecutor of tomorrow. Assurance, such as it is,
comes from an under-official. It carries no sanction that binds;
the opinion given is personal rather than official. The conference
may in fact create a hazard. It raises an issue, opens or reopens
a file, leads to a review of complaints, revives the industry's past,
invites an independent investigation.
As currently organized, the Division is in no position to give
advisory opinions. Unless the industry is under investigation,
there is no one on the staff informed on its practices; no person-
nel is available for a comprehensive check upon the industrial
pattern outlined by business officials. If the request is for ad-
vance approval upon a new and untried plan, the difficulties are
even greater. Its operation cannot be anticipated; the public in-
terest requires careful observation of its consequences as it
swings into action. But with Antitrust concentrated upon cases
elsewhere in litigation, staff cannot be spared for this adminis-
trative work.
In lending its sanction, Antitrust in fact surrenders its free-
dom of action. In name it may be at liberty to take such action
as later circumstance demands. But good faith has its compul-
sions; and the presumption runs strongly against prosecution
whatever the unforeseen events. If a number of industrial fronts
equally invite legal attack, choice is likely to fall upon that which
is a stranger to Justice. In litigation, a prior approval by the
Government is a card of consequence to the defense; at the very
least, it must be explained away. It is, of course, easy to argue
that the state cannot sacrifice its indefeasible rights through
the negligence of its officials. But in Antitrust, where intent of
the parties looms so large in the result, prior clearance of some
or all of the acts in question creates serious hazards for the gov-
ernment's case.
gate or for any other reason, and the parties decide to go ahead with the
proposed activity, any future action on the part of the Department would
be through civil proceedings."
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The Consent Decree
A secofid piece of machinery is the consent decree. The Sher-
man Act provides for no such procedure; there is no reference to
it in the Congressional debates. It emerged out of the very pro-
cess of litigation; settlement out of court is one of the oldest of
legal usages. Its first use dates from 1906 ;4 since that time 142
consent decrees have been written. Of approximately 270 pro-
ceedings instituted in equity, over half have resulted in settle-
ments by negotiation.
As a device to escape litigation, the consent decree cannot
wholly circumvent the courts. Its origin stems from the broad
power of equity. The decree, shaped by the immediate parties
to the controversy, must receive a judicial blessing. Its legal
status is that of a decree written by the court; the violation of
its command invites the action for contempt. In theory the part
of the judge is that of a master in chancery; he is supposed to
lay bare the questions in controversy, and in informed judgment
satisfy himself that the agreement does justice between the in-
dustry and the public. In fact his role is ceremonial; he brings
to the accord a passive spirit and his imlprimatur. The adverse
parties have been in protracted conference; they have arrived
at the terms of settlement; they confront the judge with a fait
accompli. The jurist has only casual knowledge of the issues; he
lacks facilities for informing himself; he has no ready norms for
testing the fairness of the provisions. He asks a few perfunctory
questions; he may make a minor change or two. The lawyers
for the government appear satisfied. He accepts the instrument
on faith.
The consent decree permits a direct attack upon problems in
industrial government. Questions do not have to be transmuted
into the alien language of the law; the procedures ordained for
ordinary courtroom use do not obtrude with their distractions.
The parties meet in informal conference; no weight of intent and
harm hangs heavy overhead; fact and value do not have to trickle
into the discussion through the conventional rules of evidence.
An opportunity is presented to a group of men, sitting around
a table, to reach a settlement grounded in industrial reality and
the demands of public policy.
4. United States v. Otis Elevator Co. (1906).
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In addition, the instrument has a sweep which no process of
law could ever impart. It can go beyond sheer prohibition; it can
attempt to shape remedies to the requirements of industrial
order. If the demand is for adjustment within an intricate
scheme of trade practices, at least it supplies the instrument. It
can reach beyond the persons in legal combat to comprehend all
the parties to the industry. It can accord some protection to
weaker groups and safeguard to some extent the rights of the
public. It can, unlike a decree emerging from litigation, take
into account the potential consequences of its terms. It can make
its attack upon the sources, rather than the manifestations, of
restraint; give consideration to activities which would never be
aired in open court; probe into matters which the prosecution
could never prove; explore conduct just outside of restraint; fol-
low wherever the trail leads. It can amend usage, create new
trade practices, provide safeguards against unintended harm.
As yet such possibilities have been little realized. The consent
decree still clings rather closely to the injunction whence it
sprang. Its dominant use has been to free dockets from cases
against minor industries; and within this narrow domain its con-
cern has too often been with trivial matters. It has been invoked
to established industrial order among makers of candy stick,
peanut cleaners and shellers, dealers in perforated music rolls,
producers of shirting cloth, the poultry trade in New York City,
wholesale jewelers, candy jobbers in four cities, manufacturers
of rubber heels, dealers in barber supplies, the hat frame in-
dustry, a thread company. Some forty cases involve trade asso-
ciations; in about a dozen of these the members agree to a dis-
solution of the organization. In all such instances the parties in
defense neither deny nor admit the government's allegations.
They simply agree, now and forevermore, to refrain from an
enumerated list of forbidden activities.5
5. Two decrees written in 1940 contain interesting variations. In United
States v. National Container Ass'n, an attempt is made to draw a line
between price-fixing and activities sanctioned by the courts. The trade asso-
ciation is specifically permitted to gather and disseminate information of
the cost of manufacture, to compile and circulate recommended procedures
for the computation of selling prices, to promote the application of uniform
cost accounting, to discuss such statistics at meetings, to exchange credit
information, and to publish data on specific current contracts of sale "for
the sole purpose of avoiding interference with such contracts." Since such
activities all tend to produce a united front in the industry, the line between
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In no more than thirty cases have large corporations been in-
volved. In each instance power was great, issues tangled, a mere
list of prohibitions hardly adequate. In 1912 a consent decree
struck at the monopoly position of the Aluminum Corporation by
voiding several of its contracts. In 1916 the National Cash Regis-
ter Company was forbidden, directly or indirectly, in whole or in
part, to acquire "an essential part of the business, patents, or
plant of any competitor without the consent of the court." In
1926 the National Food Products Corporation was ordered to di-
vest itself of ownership in the stock of certain other corpora-
tions. In 1920 a procedure against the meat-packers produced
a formidable instrument of industrial government. Threatened
with federal regulation, the Big Five sought refuge in a consent
decree prepared by Justice. It provided, among other things,
that the defendants with reasonable dispatch should divest them-
selves of their interests in public stockyards, storage plants,
stockyard terminal railroads and other productive facilities. They
were ordered to cease to do business in some one hundred and
forty commodities unrelated to their principal activity and were
forbidden to own and operate retail stores, or to sell fresh butter
and cream. A separation of meat-packing from the irrelevant
enterprises in which it had become embedded was to be effected
within two years of the date of the decree.
In 1932 a similar pattern of divestment was, with its consent,
imposed upon the Radio Corporation of America; and in 1936
upon Columbia Gas and Electric where a trustee was appointed
to hold the securities of the affiliates until their disposal. The
Ford and Chrysler decrees in 1938 contain a complicated-per-
haps an unenforceable-plan for placing independent finance
companies on a plane of competitive equality with their own sub-
sidiaries.6 In 1940 the large typewriter companies were enjoined
from securing control of competitors-through stock ownership,
purchase of assets or otherwise-without prior consent from the
court." The recent consent decree in the optical goods case de-
the legal and illegal gets pretty thin. In United States v. Tile Contractors'
Ass'n, an elaborate scheme is established for policing the decree by the
labor union.
6. As late as September, 1940, a system of registration-the real imple-
mentation of the decree-had not been brought into use. The tardiness has
been due in part to a waiting for the outcome in the General Motors case.
The consent decrees were made contingent upon the success of the Govern-
ment in its suit against General Motors.
7. United States v. Underwood Elliott Fisher Co. (1940).
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dared void a number of contracts between the Bausch & Lomb
Company and a German concern, and forbade the payment of
royalties until further order by the court. The decree involving
the Southern Pine Association splits up the activities of the trade
association; and establishes a separate organization-open to all
manufacturers of southern pine lumber without discrimination-
for grading and standardization services.
The decrees appear more formidable upon paper than in opera-
tion. More than half were written during the twenties when
government and business were in close accord. The device lends
itself to a lax enforcement of the law. The parties meet infor-
mally behind closed doors; the negotiations leave no public rec-
ord; groups who do not participate are left in the dark. The only
information available to inquiring parties is the decree itself;
and, although it is filed with the court, its terms can be under-
stood only by the person who intimately knows the industry. As
a result the instrument is useful to a sympathetic administration
in building up a paper record of accomplishment. Further, the
suit in equity carries little opprobrium; the settlement out of
court is convenient, involves little expense, and offers little em-
barrassment to the activities of the defendants.
But weakness does not inhere in the process. If the govern-
ment is bent upon enforcement it offers an instrument of vigor-
ous attack. Its use must be preceded by resolute court action
elsewhere; executives do not willingly shackle their own discre-
tion; they yield only as pressure is put upon them. A vigorous
campaign, a large number of suits, a fanfare of litigation sets
the stage for its constructive use. The great difficulty lies, not
in the capacity of Justice to impose measures, but in its want of
technical skill to turn concessions to account. The resort to law
necessitates a staff whose training and experience has been in
trial work. Their interests are focused by the task of proving
charges in open court. It is customary, when negotiations are
begun, to assign the shaping of the consent decree to the attor-
neys already busy upon the case; there are no others at haid
conversant with the practices of the industry. The trouble is that
materials of a case are not the stuff for creating an instrument
of industrial order. The distinctive competence of the resource-
ful lawyer does not find its easiest outlet in prescribing for the
maladjusted industry.
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In its procedure the formal position of the government is that
the matter is voluntary. It cannot dictate terms; the initiative
.must come from the industry; its task is no more than to accept
a preferred arrangement which accords with the law. In fact,
it plays no such passive role. Its representatives start with ideas
about what they would like to demand; as the conversations go
forward, their notions become articulate. Yet the absence of a
reliable picture of the industry, a superficial knowledge of its
structure and folkways, and ignorance in regard to the real
sources of trouble hang heavy about the conference table. They
make for a process of bargaining that is uncertain, speculative,
confused. The representatives of the government suggest leads;
but across an unfamiliar industrial terrain their footing is inse-
cure, their sense of direction none too certain. They must, for
want of detail and perspective, seek guidance from the gentlemen
of the industry.
Such a search for an industrial order is rather like the blind
leading the blind. At operating a corporation within an industry
executives are adept. It is their business and their minds have
been conditioned to its tasks. But their viewpoint is that of the
single concern and they are little accustomed to think in terms
of an entire industry. They lack an over-all view; they are little
given to detachment, critical analysis, the consideration of alter-
native arrangements. 8 So the defendants propose; the govern-
ment counters; the parties mutually thrust at plans; the ordeal
yields an aggregate of isolated prohibitions. At best the agree-
ment which emerges is a make-shift answer to the problem of
industrial order.
Nor does Justice really view the consent decree as an instru-
ment of industrial government. The dangers which attend its
creation have invoked timidity in exploring its possibilities. The
want of an independent source of information, of a clear grasp
of industrial practice, of an arsenal of constructive reforms from
which to choose, have made officials cautious in committing them-
selves. The proposed arrangements might be misused; a contin-
gency might render them obsolete; a scheme designed to restore
8. The framing of a consent decree presents to the parties in interest an
unusual opportunity to educate themselves in the problems they face. But
a lesson that has not been learned cannot be passed on; and without the
greater knowledge and the larger vision which the task demands, the oppor-
tunity is usually allowed to slip.
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competition might in practice prohibit its return. Accident is as
powerful as design; the pattern of the industry might change
overnight. Practices, which defy its spirit, might be shaped to
the very letter of the writ; a sanction accorded to an innocent
practice might later be found wrapped around a vicious one. So
long as good intent can be affected, a lot of provisions can be
made to do the things they ought not to do. And after all, pro-
visions are commitments and the Division is afraid of what
might later be discovered within their none-too-certain terms. So
the positive gives way to taboo and negation comes in to control
proceedings.
A consent decree anticipates the outcome of the suit; the
threat of recourse to law has been a factor in its growth. As
attorneys shift to conference, the carry-over of a scheme of
values from litigation is inevitable. At any moment the defen-
dants may withdraw and throw the government back upon its
chances in open court. The handicaps of legal procedure are
powerful cards which the defense can play in diluting the decree.
When more cases are on hand than can be handled and the prose-
cution must play for time, it is often constrained to accept terms
which will fall short of clearing up the situation. Where sym-
pathy with the plight of the industry prevails in official circles,
the concessions secured are usually far less. But, friendly or
hostile, the Division confronts a formidable docket, and the best
settlement possible frequently becomes a sheer necessity.
Thus the consent decree is largely a device of economy. It
spares the defense the expense of a protracted legal campaign; it
allows the Division, in some sort of way, to cover an extended
front. It is a resort to an informal process of bargaining, an at-
tempt to capture-without incurring the cost-the answer which
the legal ordeal would yield. It shifts the focus from the need of
industrial reform to the strength of the government's case. A
situation may stink to high heaven; yet, if testimony cannot be
regimented into proof or if inference must come along to fit pieces
into a pattern of restraint, the exaction must be mild. If the
companies are small and litigation an extravagance they can ill
afford, more can be demanded. If the conduct has been flagrant,
a series of solemn commandments can be written. In conse-
quence, litigation and negotiation become alternative means to
much the same result.
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Oversight without an Overseer
A matter of concern in the current use of the consent decree
is its industrial reach. The only parties bound are those named
in the instrument. If a company loses its identity through re-
organization, the decree may or may not be the kind of a chattel
which passes on. Corporations which freshly enter the industry
lie beyond its jurisdiction. Save for the vague threat of prosecu-
tion-blunted by knowledge that the industry has already been
the subject of legal scrutiny-they are at liberty to ignore its
terms. Where an industry is half-bound half-free, those who
must obey the decree are put at a competitive disadvantage.
A shift in trade practices, decreed in the settlement, may have
consequences far outside the orbit of the original decree. In de-
stroying established usages it may hurry the demise of the small
units precariously perched in the industry. Unless these com-
panies are parties to the decree, they have little voice in the
formulation of its terms. Ordinarily the original complainants
are informally consulted during negotiations, but no over-all
coverage of parties affected by its terms is possible. If repercus-
sions extend beyond the lines of the industry to allied trades, no
machinery is available for the expression of their views. In any
event the formal document can tell little of how its terms will
work in practice. The policy of secrecy accentuates the problem.
Conference often goes on when the matter is in the courts, and
any publicity might prejudice the government's case. Yet the
real issue is affected with a public interest, for it concerns the
arrangements under which an industry is to carry on. It ought
to be open to all who have a stake in the outcome."
A kindred difficulty is police. The instrument with which to
make the commands effective has not yet been forged. So long
as the dominant objective of Antitrust is legal victory, the con-
sent decree must remain a way of "closing a case." A result has
been reached, the zeal in the cause has been spent, interest moves
on. If a decree provides for immediate changes, such as the sale
9. In some of the recent consent decrees the Government has sought to
secure the viewpoint of interested outsiders. First, an effort was made to
secure representation of opinion in court at the time of the ling of the
decree; but in two or three instances judges were reluctant to open their
forums to possibly prolonged debate in open hearing. Then the Government
experimented with giving publicity to decrees before they went into effect,
and issuing a general invitation for comment. There was no response.
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of a property, a divestment of shares of stock, the dissolution of
a trade association, the file is held open until such steps are
taken. After that is done, the matter is adjudicated, the issues
are removed from controversy. In the records of Justice the epi-
sode is closed; the case has gone to the hall of records; a fresh
initiative is necessary to call it once more into action. Nor is an
effort made to follow up the decree, observe success and short-
comings in operation, check practical result against intent, deter-
mine upon necessary revisions.
The occasional modifications throw into sharp relief its in-
flexibility. A large number of decrees are decades old; the in-
dustry has been made over beyond recognition; the consent de-
cree endures untouched. About twenty-five decrees have been
hailed into court. In general the revision has risen to no higher
plane than formal change. A command to sell, divest, dissolve
has been stayed until a more propitious moment; a concern has
been permitted to acquire a negligible competitor; a trade asso-
ciation has been indulged the collection of harmless information;
a prohibition has been recast in the light of a later decision of
the Supreme Court. Such modifications are made at the behest
of private parties; in every instance the purpose has been to
liberalize the requirements imposed upon the industry. In but
a single case has Justice sought reconsideration because the de-
cree had become unsuited to later conditions in the industry. In
the spring of 1939 it moved to vacate a decree entered three
years earlier against the Columbia Gas and Electric Company.
In only five instances have proceedings been brought for con-
tempt. In one case fines aggregating $5,50010 and, in another,
$4,00011 were imposed. A couple of proceedings, involving the
moving picture industry, are still in court.12 It is only the fifth,
concerned with the manufacture and sale of cash registers,
which has left an engaging chapter in judicial history. The
case, in fact, presents in graphic illustration the assortment of
difficulties experienced by Justice in attempting to give effect
10. United States v. Southern Wholesale Grocers Ass'n (D. C. N. D. Ala.
1913) 207 Fed. 434. The decree dates from 1911, two years earlier.
11. United States v. National Retail Credit Ass'n (plea of guilty, 1935).
The consent decree was entered in 1933.
12. United States v. Barney Balaban (1938), involving consent decree
in United States v. Balaban & Katz Corp., entered in 1932; United States
v. Fox West Coast Theatres Corp. (1939), involving decree in United States
v. West Coast Theatres, Inc., entered in 1930.
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to an order of the court. It reveals the weakness of the instru-
ment with which a consent decree must be policed.
The story began in 1911, when civil and criminal suits were
concurrently brought against the National Cash Register Com-
pany and some twenty-nine of its officials. The criminal action
resulted in a verdict of guilty, and jail sentences ranging from
nine months to a year were imposed upon twenty-seven of the de-
fendants. The president of the company, one John H. Patterson,
was given a one year sentence and fined $5,000.13 The Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court for
Southern Ohio'14 and the Supreme Court refused certiorari." The
opinion of the Circuit Court was so far-reaching that Justice
felt it hopeless to go forward. So in 1916, in opposition to the
district judge who sat on the case, the government asked for a
dismissal. On the same day a consent decree was entered in the
civil suit.,,
The consent decree was rather sweeping. Among other things
it enjoined the parties from intimidating competitors and their
customers, from wrongfully obtaining the names of their com-
petitors' prospective purchasers, from the theft of business
secrets, from wrongful trade practices, from espionage. Hardly
was the ink dry upon the decree before complaints began to
pour in; the company likewise began to busy itself with the
limits of its legal bonds. First it asked the court for a number
of interpretations of the text of the decree. Then it went to
Justice to ask for modifications. Justice in turn called upon the
Federal Trade Commission for an analysis of the operation of
the decree. Within two months the company withdrew its re-
quest. Meanwhile complaints continued to accumulate and a
major competitor, the Remington Cash Register Company, em-
ployed a prominent New York law firm to press for action. The
evidence accumulated; an Attorney General went and another
took his place; in 1925 Antitrust determined to institute pro-
ceedings. A major question was who in particular was to be
cited for criminal contempt. Salesmen were engaging in prac-
13. United States v. Patterson, 1 Decrees and Judgments in Federal
Anti-Trust Cases 795.
14. Patterson v. United States (C. C. A. 6, 1915) 222 Fed. 599.
15. United States v. Patterson (1915) 238 U. S. 635.
16. United States v. National Cash Register Co., 1 Decrees and Judg-
ments in Federal Anti-Trust Cases 315.
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tices which the decree forbade; circumstance pointed to knowl-
edge and complicity by the officials of the company; there was
no overt testimony to supply the connecting tissue. Some attor-
neys in the Division were loath to strike high without the neces-
sary proof. Others believed that proof of actual knowledge,
while helpful, was not essential; that it was the business of the
company to see to it that their petty officials were law-abiding;
that the mere fact of violation was enough to constitute con-
tempt of court. In the end-as so frequently happens-the less
hazardous view prevailed and the action was confined to the
ninety-two sales agents who had been direct participants in
disobeying the court's order.17
The company was not at a loss for weapons of defense. As
soon as the action for contempt was brought, the corporation
was reorganized; it was pleaded that the new legal person was
immune to the court order. A like immunity was claimed for
persons who were not in the company's employ at the time of
the decree. It was also contended that the powers of the court
of equity were limited to its district; that the judge could pun-
ish for contempt only those salesmen wko had operated in the
Southern District of Ohio. It was insisted that, unless action
was begun within one year of the time the acts occurred, it was
barred by the statute of limitations. In the course of the trial,
the charges against seventy of the defendants were dismissed
because of insufficient evidence. Later, on the ground that the
government had not acted in time, the judge dismissed eighteen
of the twenty-two who were left.18 The later ruling was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court which reversed. 19
Back the case went to the district court. Meanwhile the ener-
gies of the government had flagged; it now moved to dismiss
twenty of the defendants. Thus of the original ninety-two, two
survived the ordeal of interlocutory motions to be tried. In 1928
the District Court found one of them guilty on two counts and
imposed a fine of $1,000 on each count. It dismissed the infor-
mation against the remaining person. In 1929 a motion by Jus-
tice for a new trial was denied. As a final blow, in 1931 the
17. Department of Justice files on National Cash Register Co., File No.
60-51-0.
18. United States v. Whiffen (D. C. S. D. Ohio 1927) 23 F. (2d) 352.
19. United States v. Goldman (1928) 277 U. S. 229.
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decree was modified to permit National Cash Register to acquire
Remington Cash Register, the very company which throughout
the twenties worked aggressively for the enforcement of the
decree. Since 1916 violation of the decree had been flagrant, yet
the net result of all efforts was a fine of $2,000 against a single
salesman.The ordinary antitrust suit has problems enough. The follow-
up in contempt, in addition, presents difficulties all its own, many
of them new to the courts. What is the precise meaning of the
language of the decree? How are set terms to be accommodated
to a changing pattern of trade practices? In the hierarchy of an
industry whom does it bind? How far does its jurisdiction ex-
tend beyond the persons, natural and artificial, who are named
in the instrument? Along the various planes of corporate official-
dom, how much of knowledge and of participation must be
proved? If violation is virtually compelled by the necessity of
meeting competition from companies not named in the decree,
what then? If new practices are devised as a way around the
prohibitions, has there been contempt? How long must the gov-
ernment wait after a decree has been entered before bringing
an action? And how long can it pause after the overt act before
losing its right to strike? What if, in the interval, the industry
has been quite transformed in technology, structure, trade prac-
tices, markets and wares? What if only a few among many
former units are now bound? 20
In five cases involving divestment proceedings, trustees have
been appointed pending the disposal of the stock.21 A major
difficulty here has been the spasmodic interest of Justice. The
decree usually antedates the current administration; the attor-
neys who handled it are gone or to them it has grown cold. Their
knowledge has been submerged beneath the materials of more
recent cases; the intangibles have left little trace behind in the
20. A move has lately been made towards easier administration of con-
sent decrees. A provision, embodied in all recent decrees, grants to Justice
access to all books and records. Reports upon the operation of the decree
may also be required. The provision holds real possibilities. For the first
time the files of the offending company are open without roundabout of
grand jury and subpoena. The great weakness is that the Division lacks
the facilities for the follow-up essential to keep the decree alive.
21. United States v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. (1914); United States
v. Swift & Co. (1920); United States v. Fox Theatres Corp. (1921); United
States v. Rand Kardex Bureau (1926) United States v. Columbia Gas &
Electric Corp. (1936).
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records. All that remains alive of the industry, its trade prac-
tices, ancient pattern of restraint, is a bulking and silent file
over which - as a ghost of a case closed - hovers the decree.
In isolation, and without the Division's lawyers to prod, the
trustee takes his course. He is more responsive to pressures
which are current than to those that are gone; to the flesh and
blood that bears down upon him than to volitionless files. He
is driven forward-or stopped in his tracks-by a personal in-
terest. His task is to speed the sale of securities in his hands;
his stake in a job which expires when his duty is done bids him
await a favorable market. As a result, a company may maintain
its equity for years after it has been ordered by the court to
divest itself of the holdings. In any event the immediate counts
for more than the remote, and the trustee tends more and more
to take the industry's view of the matters he handles.
All the difficulties appear in the classic of consent decrees,
that against the meat-packers. 22 The agreement of 1920 pro-
vided, among other things, for an immediate disposal by the Big
Five of their interests in public stockyards. They were likewise
required to separate themselves from concerns dealing in various
canned products. At the outside the process of divestment was
to be completed within a period of two years. Almost at once
the packers began an attack upon the decree to which they had
voluntarily consented. The first move came from off-stage; the
California Cooperative Canneries appealed to the Attorney Gen-
eral for modification.23 Then, as a third party, they asked to in-
tervene, went into court, and moved that the decree be vacated
on the ground that it disturbed their contractual relations with
a party to it. The Canneries had a ten-year contract for the sale
to Armour of all their products it might require. A clause pro-
vided that, in case of government interference, Armour was free
to abrogate the contract on sixty days notice. At the time the
Canneries were heavily in debt to Armour. Whether the Can-
neries acted on their own motion, or whether they were prompted
by the packers, is a moot question. The trial court decided for
the government and was reversed on appeal. The Court of Ap-
peals declared that the Canneries had lost valuable assets with-
22. United States v. Swift and Co.
23. Department of Justice files in United States v. Swift & Co., File No.
60-50-0.
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out a right to be heard; that there had been a taking of property
without due process of law .2
In 1924, while this matter was still pending, Swift and Armour
filed their own motions to vacate the decree. They argued that
the packers had denied violations of the antitrust acts; that there
was no genuine case in controversy; that the court lacked juris-
diction to enter the decree; that the Attorney General had no
power to exclude persons from a legitimate business. A number
of ancillary attacks were made on the decree-its vagueness and
generality, its comprehensive character, its want of factual sup-
port. The trial court, feeling itself bound by the appellate ruling
in the Canneries case, suspended the decree. In such a matter,
a definite ruling could come only from the highest court, and in
1928 and 1929 the Supreme Court found no merit either in the
direct attack by the packers25 or in the collateral attack upon
the decree by the Canneries.26
The packers, however, were prepared for this legal pitfall.
In 1930 they again embarked upon litigation-this time to secure
modification of the decree. Their complaint was a woeful series
of corporate wrongs; their prayer for relief-finite in the in-
stance-asked in the aggregate for a virtual scrapping of the
instrument. Their argument postulated a revolutionary change
in economic conditions, the rise of the grocery chains, their need
for diversifying their business, the necessity for retail outlets,
the economies in distribution direct from process to consumer,
the utility of all of this to the consumer, its compatibility with
the ideal of competition. In the trial court the packers won a
partial victory, which again was lost in the Supreme Court.27
In 1932, a period was written to twelve years of litigation; the
letter of the decree and the position of the parties had not been
changed one bit.
So long as cases were in the courts, the packers made no
effort to divest themselves of equities in forbidden companies.
Then in 1931, eleven years after the command had been given,
Armour hastened to obey the order of the court. Its interest in
24. California Cooperative Canneries v. United States (App. D. C. 1924)
299 Fed. 908.
25. Swift & Co. v. United States (1928) 276 U. S. 311.
26. United States v. California Cooperative Canneries (1929) 279 U. S.
553.
27. United States v. Swift and Co. (1932) 286 U. S. 106.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss1/1
1940] ANTITRUST-REACH AFTER NEW WEAPONS 17
the General Stockyards Corporation was disposed of to three
companies owned by members of the Armour family. When cor-
porate gears are disengaged, personal ties may still abide and
it seems probable that so fictitious a divestment still leaves the
order of the court unfulfilled. The Swift Company showed no
such precipitate haste. In 1932, in accordance with the mandate
of the Supreme Court, the trial court appointed a trustee and
directed that gentleman to dispose of the proscribed holdings
in Libby, MacNeil and Libby within one year. In 1933 the defen-
dants asked for a further period in which to rid themselves
of their interest in the canning company. The court refused
and directed the trustees to see that the block of stock found its
way into hands legally competent to hold it. In 1936 Swift di-
vested itself of a part of its investment in stockyards.
The months dragged on. In the spring of 1939 Justice, its
patience exhausted, sought to force disposal of Swift's interest
in the large canning concern. It attempted to secure from the
court an order to the trustee calling for bids. This action was
vigorously contested on the ground that market conditions did
not warrant sale of the stock. During the summer the judge
called the parties to his chambers and announced that he had
decided to grant the motion. He would, however, refrain from
taking public action until the defendants had been accorded a
reasonable time to dispose of the holdings. Shortly thereafter
the sale was made and in November of that year the court ap-
proved a plan for the disposal of the Swift stock. Thus, after
nineteen years of litigation, an important provision in the pack-
ers' consent decree was at last given real effect.
The innovation of the consent decree has made its modest
addendum to the Sherman Act. If experience has ripened into
so little of novelty, at least strands have appeared upon which
a fabric of administrative control may be woven.
Towards an Administrative Base
A movement away from litigation, and towards an adminis-
trative base, seems inevitable. Justice has, against its will, been
forced to grant a skeptical indulgence to the advisory opinion.
It has, to speed its work along, been compelled to make a cautious
use of the consent decree. Each is still a blunt tool in the early
stage of development; each needs to be shaped into a nimble in-
strument of control.
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In other domains the advisory opinion has been converted into
the administrative ruling. It is argued that rule-making ought
to be domesticated to use in Antitrust. Its informal process is
simplicity itself. The representatives of a trade come to Justice
with their program. Negotiations are entered into. The result-
ing agreement is virtually a contract between the industry and
the government. The companies pledge behavior in accordance
with the terms of the document. Justice promises immunity in
respect to the enumerated practices.
The argument is persuasive. The single standard of the Sher-
man Act does well enough as a norm; but reason dictates its
accommodation to the circumstances of particular industries.
Litigation is too ponderous for the case by case approach; the
administrative ruling seems to meet the need for a more flex-
ible and expeditious remedy. It promises alike to free business
enterprise from unnecessary legal hazards and to bring its activ-
ities into closer accord with the law. It opens the door to~execu-
tives honestly in quest of advice. It lifts the cloud of uncertainty
beneath which businessmen must now launch their ventures.
Surely it is within the realm of reason that persons vitally con-
cerned be informed in advance about the meaning of the statute;
and if they act in reliance upon such advice, the consequent fault
is not theirs.
Advance clearance also promises to raise the level of enforce-
ment. The appearance of businessmen is voluntary. They come
on their own business rather than as defendants. No stigma of
potential crime attaches to their presence; no presumption of
guilt has become an article of faith; the industrial landscape
is not read in terms of a hypothesis of monopoly. In a spirit of
amity the parties can address themselves to the practical prob-
lems in the industry. The process accommodates itself to the
volume of traffic. A matter at issue can go forward at a frac-
tion of the former cost; the expenses, even of inquiry, would
be materially reduced by the cooperation of business. 28 With the
28. It can be plausibly argued that the outlay incurred keeping an in-
dustry orderly and within the law is a necessary cost of production. If so,
the expenses essential to such a control might be borne by the trades con-
cerned or by industry generally. The resulting betterment in the mores of
business might well pay its own way. A precedent is offered in the office
of the Coordinator of Transportation, 1934-1936. The expenses of Com-
missioner Eastman's establishment were logically assessed against the
railroads.
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funds at its disposal, Antitrust could supervise a far larger
segment of the national economy.
In its result the administrative ruling approximates the con-
sent decree addressed to positive remedies. Both go beyond a
listing of prohibitions; sanction is given to a code of industrial
behavior. The government and industry in cooperation spell
out a line of business activity which is believed to accord with
public policy, and in the furtherance of which immunity from
prosecution is promised. The essential difference is that one
arises from the initiative of businessmen, the other from the
threat of litigation by the government. The one can be used
where industrialists are anxious to secure clearance on their
trade practices, the other where they are loath to act and the
incentive must come from the enforcement agency.
At the very threshold stand a series of questions. Exactly
what is an industry? What are the limits of its coverage? Are
producers of special products to be crowded off into an associa-
tion of their own? Suppose that the by-product of one industry
competes with the main product of another? What of a case like
rayon against silk, where the products of separate industries
compete? How is representation to be secured from all who
have a stake in the result? How is the group to be kept con-
stant, when parties in interest vary from question to question?
How are the rights of minority groups to be protected? Of firms
that live along the fringes? Of outsiders to whom a connection
is necessary to carry on? As interest becomes more and more
remote, where is the line to be drawn? Amid a babble of tongues
what chance is there of a real accord? Would the decree bind
only those who signed on the dotted line? What of the recalci-
trant ten percent whose activities would frustrate the result?29
How, too, in shaping the decree, could questions of policy be
avoided? Would Justice encourage the advance of technology
and the elimination of the unfit? Would it promote a highly
dynamic economy in which every concern had forever newly
to make good? Or would it, in recognizing demands for eco-
nomic security, keep the little fellow in business? Could it, in
29. In quite a different set-up N. R. A. had to face many such problems.
Had the experiment continued for some time, its experience might throw
much light upon the path ahead. As it was, the great mass of these ques-
tions did not get answered; they were not even adequately raised.
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the face of pressure from organized petty trade, escape "the
politics of industry"? How could it avoid freezing the existing
industrial structure with all its waste and extravagance? Could
it keep industries open to all who wished to take their chances?
Or would it, by sanction and injunction, create vested interests
within an enduring frame-work of business? As the years
passed, would the impact of its decisions tend towards a more
efficient, articulate, purposeful economy? Would it in time be
compelled to abandon competition for a more "realistic" phi-
losophy? It is easy enough to extend such questions, immediate
and remote, into a real catechism. But their import is clear
enough. They indicate how uncharted is the way of formal
control, how great the obstacles to be faced, how many the dis-
tractions to be avoided, how easily the end may be lost in con-
cern with the instance.
The process of negotiation also demands its safeguards. The
businessman wants advice before the fact; the government de-
mands security for its plighted word. If both are to be satisfied
the judgment must be based upon a knowledge that anticipates
the future. An open file on an industry should precede by many
months the formal raising of any question. It should be kept
up-to-date, be available at any moment. All information rela-
tive to trade usage should be gathered, arranged, indexed. But,
if facts are to shape judgment, analysis must convert them into
understanding. The administrative agency must become famil-
iar with the industry; it must know intimately its structure,
products, markets, technology, folkways, balance of large and
small units, affiliations with other trades, place in the national
economy. It should possess norms with which to test the good
faith in proposals submitted, envisage their practical operation,
evaluate them as remedies for current maladjustment. It should
not have to seek its data from the corporations before it. Its
access to independent sources of information would eliminate
the fear of entering into an agreement blindfold.
The character of the decree which results must accord with
its function. In a world of good and bad, an eternal ban can be
laid against a practice that is evil; in a court of equity it may
be perpetually enjoined. But the affairs of an economy are
doomed to change and the perspective shifts with the increase
in understanding. In the current state of knowledge, a definite
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code for an industry is out of the question. The agreement can
at its first writing be little more than a tentative hypothesis for
the conduct of an industry. Every measure which it contains
is subject to correction; either party should at any time for good
cause have the right to move for amendment.
Its use demands a constant oversight of the operation of the
trade. In the past a serious problem has been the follow-up of
decrees. If their terms had been adequately policed, the story
of antitrust enforcement would be far less a series of sporadic
episodes. Justice cannot afford to win hard-fought battles only
to allow victories to be eaten away by inaction. It hardly suf-
fices to cure the patient if he is to be permitted to relapse into
disease. It does little good to outlaw a practice if a substitute
is permitted to achieve the same objective. The void in making
the law work can be overcome only by a regular check-up.
Thus the consent decree and the administrative ruling become
instruments of government. Their initial provisions would re-
flect the best of current knowledge and belief. But they should
be subject to amendment as practice, circumstance, and expand-
ing knowledge may suggest. A breach of the terms should be
a civil offense, reached by a simple administrative process, and
remedied by mandate or punished by fine. To such an instru-
ment a tentative official assent would be accorded. Justice could
not protest activities which conform to its terms, but it could
at any time move for their revision. Save for conduct that lay
clearly without the law, firms would not have to carry on under
permanent injunctions which they are powerless to lift. As the
operation of the industry might demand and so far as the public
interest would allow, any provision could be modified.
It is useless to minimize such a task of public oversight. The
concern of most other supervisory bodies is with a narrow do-
main or a single aspect of an industry at work. In comparison
to agencies concerned with the railroads, the merchant marine,
corporate securities, the task would be gigantic. Antitrust would
have to operate over almost the total area of the national econ-
omy. Certain provinces would be excluded or rarely demand
attention. The trades local in character are beyond its scope; for
many parts of the economy-motor transport, railroads, the
staples of agriculture - Congress has made other provision;
where competition is operative there is no need of supervision;
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aspects of industrial practice fall more properly within the orbit
of the Federal Trade Commission. But, with due regard to every
limit set by local charter, legislative exception, adequacy of regu-
lation by the market-the domain is broad and still largely un-
explored. It is idle to attempt to bring it under the authority of
the Sherman Act all at once. There can be no immediate escape
from the hit or miss approach of the individual case. A rough
formula should determine the industries selected for immediate
attention. Its terms should be departure from the competitive
standard, the harm to competitors and consumers, the place of
the trade in the national economy.
The Task of Re-Tooling
To the newer process the Antitrust Division would have to be
regeared. Administration would be pivoted upon Sections
charged with industrial analysis and the formulation of rulings
and decrees. The task of the former should be to capture a pic-
ture, in clean-cut perspective and comprehensive detail, of the
industry in operation. Against the background of structure and
pattern of usage, the sources of maladjustment should be laid
bare. If every case leads to an adequate diagnosis, the results
should prove cumulative. Even under an ad hoe approach, little
by little the topography of the national economy will emerge.
Industries may range themselves into types; a trouble-spot may
be matched against others of its kind; fault lines will be dis-
covered in the economy along which disorder may be expected.
A growing body of experience will be at hand upon which to
draw as occasion demands.3 0
The Decree Section should be concerned with remedies. Its
task is constructive; its work begins where that of the other
division leaves off. Its proposals must be grounded in adequate
analysis; but they involve choices between alternative schemes
of arrangement which imagination must help knowledge to predi-
cate. Its concern is in a sense the technology of industrial order.
As inventors further the economic arts, its office is to create and
improve the devices and procedures through which an industry
30. It has been suggested that Justice farm out its work of investigation
to another agency. Since an inquiry is shaped to the purpose it serves,
this would compromise its work. Besides neither the Federal Trade Com-
mission nor the Department of Commerce is equipped in objective, tradi-
tion. or personnel for a work of such character and magnitude.
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maintains order, carries on, does justice between the several
parties concerned. To turn its work to account it must engage
in a constant oversight of the decrees which it has to administer.
An institution can hardly drive so far without creating an
antithesis between its inherited form and its assumed office. As
a division of Justice, the task of Antitrust has been that of
prosecutor; as an arbiter of arrangements under which an in-
dustry is to carry on, it has stumbled into an administration
office. The tasks should not be confused; and, to their separation
the process of negotiation should be placed-wher6 in function
it has already drifted-outside the Antitrust Division. Justice
should be left free to inquire, to complain, to move for a remedy
-activities in strict accord with its distinctive competence. But
the Decree Section should be freed from its ancient bondage to
litigation, given its independence, fitted out with all the requisites
of its office. The public control of business awaits the creative
work of the administrative agency.
Judicial review should be by way of a specially constructed
industrial court of five or seven members. They should be as
competent in the ways of industry as they are learned in its law.
All protests against administrative rulings whether by Justice
or by a private party, would go to this bench. From it appeal
would lie directly to the United States Supreme Court. The
court, like any federal tribunal, would sit at law and in equity.
In the exceptional case, it would sit en bloc; the run of mine
business would be dispatched by a single judge. As occasion de-
manded, it would hear criminal actions, refer issues to the jury,
impose penalties. It would more often sit in tort and assess
against corporations and their officials the appropriate fines. In
the policing of decrees, a host of minor or major violations would
be brought before it. It would issue injunctions, order divest-
ment and dissolution, devise codes of fair conduct.
At present it is a matter of chance in what district an anti-
trust suit is brought. The case stands apart from the run-of-
mine grist of the judicial mill; the judge's ability to keep his
footing over an unfamiliar terrain is a matter of accident. Under
the new arrangements cases would go to a court experienced in
industrial matters. A host of scattered suits would be garnered
into a single docket. In time there would emerge a "code indus-
trial" possessed of such focus, breadth and consistency as human
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nature and the changing circumstances of industry would allow.
Its decisions would come to constitute for business a flexible
law of public control.
A Finai Caveat
At its beginning the Sherman Act was public policy in respect
to business. Today it is one of a number of acts in which public
policy is recorded. Then it was the legal weapon for the control
of business; now it is a single instrument in the arsenal of
regulation. It is still the dominant expression of public purpose,
and other measures are still written as qualifications or special
cases. But legislation already upon the statute books is grounded
upon other assumptions; and economic creeds, other than com-
petition, have arisen to dispute its foundation. Nor is the area
in which industrial fact accords with its presumption as large
as once it was. Almost everywhere the free and open market
has lost its primitive simplicity; nowhere does it operate in the
complete and automatic way once glibly assumed. In a word,
the world has grown up, industry has compromised competition
with its folkways, the sovereignty of antitrust in public policy
is no longer absolute.
Antitrust is a symbol of democracy. It is an assertion that
every industry is affected with a public interest. Quite apart
from its operation, it keeps alive within law and public policy
a value which must not be sacrificed or abridged. It asserts the
firm, the trade, the economy to be the instrument of the general
welfare. If the fact falls short of the ideal, the call is to amend
the fact rather than abandon the ideal. It may be that in many
industrial areas, the free and open market has been compromised
or is forever gone. Still its norms of order and justice endure
to serve as standards for performance under another arrange-
ment. In matters where the market can be restored to its eco-
nomic office, there should be caution in substituting administra-
tion. A hazard to the common good attends the enlargement of
personal discretion.
No matter how competent the agency, informed persons
shudder at the replacement of the open market by personal dis-
cretion. Only the impotence of competition to do what is ex-
pected of it invites the change. A case for the shift is wanting
unless safeguards can be contrived to replace those which the
minority group, the consumers, the interests interlocked with
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the industry, are forced to surrender. The administrative agency
invites the very invasion of economic power which the competi-
tive market is supposed to be proof against. It is played upon
by all the pressures which powerful groups can muster into ser-
vice.
Other ventures have not pointed an alluring way. The com-
missions have been very effective in closing public utilities to
outsiders; they have been far less successful in assuring fair
charges to the users of their services. Their rigidities have dis-
couraged experimentation with price which might have brought
power and light within the reach of lower and lower income
groups. The Interstate Commerce Commission has been swamped
beneath a deluge of detail. Save for the brief life of the Co-
ordinator's office, it has spent little energy upon a forward plan
for the railroads. The various agricultural controls-corn, milk,
wheat, sugar, cotton, tobacco-have been very sensitive to the
plight of the farmers, negligent of farm labor, and indifferent
to the general public who must pay the bill.
The NRA, brief as was its life, staged a full dress performance
of the hazards of the administrative process. Wide powers were
granted-to become sanctions under which the strategic group
could lord it over the industry. The strong were served under
the affectation of protecting the weak; managerial privilege was
entrenched under a pretense of fairness to the little fellow and
to labor. Rules were written, presently to be smothered beneath
a flood of exceptions; the vague clauses in codes were made to
mean what interested parties wanted them to mean; "emer-
gencies" were invoked to justify orders which otherwise would
have been intolerable.
Such dangers, always imminent, may be forestalled. But
vigilance must not relapse for even a moment. The question of
privilege is seldom directly put; it emerges in a score of dis-
guised issues. A scheme to restrict output is presented as a
limitation upon the hours of labor. A cost formula for price is
invoked to allow the little fellow to recover his expenses. A re-
duction of capacity is intended to do no more than bring it
within hailing distance of what the market will take. A provi-
sion, fair upon its face, operates to the detriment of a firm whose
progressive ways have been an embarrassment to the industry.
The barrage of pressures is so persistent-the writing of a spe-
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cial rule, the invocation of an emergency, the declaration of an
exception-that the staunchest official has difficulty in with-
standing it. It emerges in forms so innocent that he must be
forever alert lest his resolution be outflanked. The impulses
from the privileged are omnipresent and strong; the voice of the
unorganized, weak and faltering. To catch the perspective the
administrative agency must supply its own amplifier.
Such a move is no more than the next step. As change obeys
its dynamic urge, the result may be a restatement of the problem
of public control. Trends are already manifest of which this
proposal takes little account. But their lines must be more
sharply defined before that can become the concern of national
policy. The stress and strain in industrial structure proceeds
from a clash which runs deep. At the moment a triple demand
is being laid upon the national economy-it must take the turbu-
lent course of events; it must assimilate a medley of public
controls long overdue; it must provide an adequate national de-
fense. It may well be that here is more traffic than the system of
free enterprise can carry. But if competition belongs to an inter-
lude in history-a lull between ages of unlike authority-only
its events can reveal the next stage.
The task of keeping industry the instrument of the common-
wealth is as arduous as it is everlasting.
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